My dissertation defends a view of welfare I call "basic prudential hedonism". You can read it here.
I'm currently working on a couple of papers about pleasure, pain, and welfare. See brief descriptions below. |
An Argument for Pure Phenomenalism about Pleasure and Pain
Pure phenomenalism about hedonic states says that what makes any given mental state a pleasure or a pain (or neither) is just the way that it feels. Theories on which pleasure and pain can be felt, but which reject pure phenomenalism, imply that it’s possible to have an experience that feels exactly like pleasure to you, but isn’t pleasure; that it’s possible to have an experience that feels exactly like pain to you, but isn’t pain; or both. We should not accept any view that has either of these implications. Therefore, insofar as hedonic states exist and can be felt, we should embrace pure phenomenalism about pleasure and pain.
See latest draft here.
A Phenomenal Constraint on Theories of Welfare
Any adequate theory of welfare must allow that some phenomenal states - i.e. some feelings - have positive value, and others negative value, irrespective of whether the subject holds any attitude toward them. To deny this is to allow that someone can be in a state subectively indistinguishable from the most wonderful pleasure without having their welfare increase even pro tanto, and that someone can be in a state subjectively indistinguishable from the most horrible pain without having their welfare decrease even pro tanto. The result is a "phenomenal constraint" on theories of welfare that cuts against views based on occurrent desires or preferences.
I haven't finished a draft of this one yet, but once I do, avid readers of joenelson.info will be the first to know.
Pure phenomenalism about hedonic states says that what makes any given mental state a pleasure or a pain (or neither) is just the way that it feels. Theories on which pleasure and pain can be felt, but which reject pure phenomenalism, imply that it’s possible to have an experience that feels exactly like pleasure to you, but isn’t pleasure; that it’s possible to have an experience that feels exactly like pain to you, but isn’t pain; or both. We should not accept any view that has either of these implications. Therefore, insofar as hedonic states exist and can be felt, we should embrace pure phenomenalism about pleasure and pain.
See latest draft here.
A Phenomenal Constraint on Theories of Welfare
Any adequate theory of welfare must allow that some phenomenal states - i.e. some feelings - have positive value, and others negative value, irrespective of whether the subject holds any attitude toward them. To deny this is to allow that someone can be in a state subectively indistinguishable from the most wonderful pleasure without having their welfare increase even pro tanto, and that someone can be in a state subjectively indistinguishable from the most horrible pain without having their welfare decrease even pro tanto. The result is a "phenomenal constraint" on theories of welfare that cuts against views based on occurrent desires or preferences.
I haven't finished a draft of this one yet, but once I do, avid readers of joenelson.info will be the first to know.