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My dissertation defends a version of hedonism as a theory of well-being. You can read my dissertation abstract on page 3 of my C.V. here.
In the near term, I plan to pursue several closely related projects that I intend to turn into standalone papers on the philosophy of well-being, the epistemology of value, and utilitarianism. Brief descriptions of four of these planned papers are given below. More broadly, I am interested in the overall project of defending philosophical theories that, like basic prudential hedonism, seek to capture the relevant phenomena with an especially austere set of fundamental claims. |
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(SIn the course of defending such theories, one encounters a serious challenge: if reducing the number of a theory’s fundamental claims comes at the cost of making it counterintuitive in some way, and neither formal nor empirical methods are available to vindicate the theory, how do we defend it without lapsing into some kind of self-defeating skepticism? This question is relevant across philosophical disciplines, and so I expect that pursuing it will eventually take me beyond value theory.
1. A New Defense of Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure
In this paper I argue that pleasures are phenomenologically unified: all pleasures, physical and emotional, feel the same in some way, and feeling this way is what makes a pleasure what it is.
This stands in contrast to two competing theses about pleasure. Attitudinal theories claim that pleasures are defined by relations between states of affairs and attitudes; disunified theories claim that there is nothing that all the states we call pleasures have in common.
I propose that all theories of pleasure must account for these three facts:
1. The states we think of as pleasurable are so phenomenologically diverse that it is difficult or impossible to introspectively discern any common felt quality.
2. Despite (1), we typically speak of pleasure as though it is a unified category.
3. We are frequently (perhaps always) capable of recognizing when we are experiencing pleasure, and this recognition is often virtually immediate, even in some cases of novel experiences.
I then argue that a phenomenological theory of pleasure can offer a better explanation of (1)-(3) than any attitudinal or disunified theory. Attitudinal theories cannot plausibly account for (3), and disunified theories fail with respect to both (2) and (3).
This has major implications for value theory. It is common for philosophers to claim that pleasure is intrinsically valuable. But if this is true, and the phenomenological approach to pleasure is right, then it is possible for something (namely pleasure) to be valuable without being the object of a valuing attitude. In other words, the claim that pleasure is intrinsically good, together with a phenomenological theory of pleasure, entail that subjectivism about value is false.
2. The Indifference Objection to Theories of Welfare
Objective theories in the philosophy of welfare say that some things can be good for you even when you do not want, like, or value them. Such theories face the objection that nothing can be good for you if you do not bear some kind of favorable attitude toward it. Call this the “indifference objection”. This aim of this paper to dispel this objection.
We must distinguish the indifference objection from the much-discussed “resonance constraint” on theories of welfare. The resonance constraint says, roughly, that whatever is intrinsically good for S must be something that S could want, like, or value under the right circumstances. The indifference objection is stricter: it says that for X to be intrinsically good for S at t, S must have some favorable attitude toward X at t.
To avoid the indifference objection, a theory must say that something can be good for you only if it is the object of the right sort of occurrent favorable attitude. Hence the indifference objection applies not only to objective theories of welfare, but also to some subjective theories. For example, it applies to any desire-satisfaction theory that identifies a subject’s welfare with the satisfaction of the subject’s idealized desires rather than their actual ones. It also applies to desire-satisfaction theories that say that what is good for a subject is the combination of an actual intrinsic desire with the state of affairs that satisfies it.
But, I argue, the “actualist” theories of welfare that avoid the indifference objection are independently implausible. Such theories face a dilemma. If they allow certain things to be the objects of value-activating attitudes, then they are at best normatively implausible and at worst logically incoherent. But the more they restrict the range of acceptable objects of value-activating attitudes, the more they appear to be objective theories of welfare in disguise.
3. Phenomenal Conservatism and Evaluative Seemings
Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), as defined by Michael Huemer, says the following: if it seems to S that p, then in the absence of defeaters, S is thereby justified to some degree in believing that p.
For this paper, I am interested in what PC can offer to value theory. If PC is true, then what evaluative propositions can we legitimately claim to be prima facie justified in believing?
A seeming, as understood here, is as a non-belief, non-inferential mental state. According to PC, seemings are sources of basic justification: an undefeated seeming that p confers justification on a belief that p in a way that does not depend on any other belief.
The plausibility of PC depends on the stipulation that seemings are non-belief, non-inferential mental states. But this raises a question: when we feel inclined to believe that p, how do we know that this inclination is (or is the result of) a genuine seeming? How do we know that this inclination is not just the result of our already believing that p, or of an inference from pre-existing beliefs? If we do not know this, then even if seemings justify some of our beliefs, we will not be justified in claiming that they do. This would make PC epistemically useless, at least when it comes to philosophical argumentation.
I propose that we cannot introspectively distinguish genuine seemings from other conscious inclinations to believe propositions. Nor can we plausibly claim that certain inclinations to believe simply seem like seemings. Call this the “introspection problem” for PC. To solve the introspection problem for a given proposition that we feel consciously inclined to believe, we need to be justified on non-introspective grounds in believing that this inclination either is a seeming or is ultimately traceable to a seeming.
The introspection problem is especially pressing for evaluative propositions, because in many cases, we can plausibly account for our inclinations to believe evaluative propositions by proposing that these inclinations merely reflect preexisting beliefs or inferences therefrom. The same cannot be said of, for example, many perceptual propositions. (If I am inclined to believe on the basis of vision that my hand is currently in front of my face at time t, it is not plausible that this is something I just happened to already believe before t, or an inference from things I already believed before t.)
I argue that the introspection problem can be solved for some basic evaluative propositions, such as the proposition that it is possible for a person’s life to get worse for them. There is no plausible explanation of our inclination to believe this proposition according to which it is not traceable to a seeming. However, the introspection problem still afflicts many other evaluative propositions. Even something as uncontroversial as the proposition that suffering is bad may not be immune.
I conclude that PC offers value theorists a small supply of basically justified propositions. However, this may be all we need to undergird plausible and sophisticated theories of prudential and moral value.
4. Scalar Utilitarianism and Political Activism
Classical act utilitarianism (CAU) fits awkwardly with some of our considered judgments about political activism. Though people disagree about what kinds of political activism are laudable, virtually all can agree that some such actions are morally commendable. In cases where the costs of collective political inaction are high, some may even regard participation in activism as morally obligatory. But in many real cases, including those most likely to be seen as morally commendable or obligatory, CAU delivers the verdict that individual acts of participation in political activism are morally wrong.
Scalar utilitarianism (SU), which dispenses with judgments of moral right and wrong in favor of evaluating acts against one another on a continuous scale of good and bad (according to how much net utility they produce), does not have this troubling implication. Thus, though often regarded as a less intuitive variant of utilitarianism, SU has a distinct advantage over CAU when it comes to vindicating common sense judgments about political activism.
Political activism typically requires mass collective effort, in which individual contributions to the success of the movement are negligible. Hence in many cases, participation in political activism will require that an agent perform acts that are not the most utility-conducive available, and which are therefore by CAU’s lights morally wrong. This is true on both the objective (actual utility) and subjective (rationally expected utility) interpretations of CAU.
This presents a dilemma for classical act utilitarians. They must either affirm that many individual contributions to political movements, including those movements that have been massively utility-producing in aggregate, are not morally commendable; or they must affirm that there can be acts which are both morally commendable and wrong.
SU avoids this dilemma, and allows utilitarians to assess political activism in a clear and coherent manner. Political activism is morally risky. In cases of resistance to repressive regimes, one can even be gambling with one’s life (and those of others). Well-intentioned political activists will perform some acts that are utilitarianly sub-optimal, including some that produce more bad than good. But they are not morally wrong in doing so. Moreover, we can coherently affirm that many such acts are morally commendable, insofar as they reflect generally utility-promoting traits of the agent.
1. A New Defense of Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure
In this paper I argue that pleasures are phenomenologically unified: all pleasures, physical and emotional, feel the same in some way, and feeling this way is what makes a pleasure what it is.
This stands in contrast to two competing theses about pleasure. Attitudinal theories claim that pleasures are defined by relations between states of affairs and attitudes; disunified theories claim that there is nothing that all the states we call pleasures have in common.
I propose that all theories of pleasure must account for these three facts:
1. The states we think of as pleasurable are so phenomenologically diverse that it is difficult or impossible to introspectively discern any common felt quality.
2. Despite (1), we typically speak of pleasure as though it is a unified category.
3. We are frequently (perhaps always) capable of recognizing when we are experiencing pleasure, and this recognition is often virtually immediate, even in some cases of novel experiences.
I then argue that a phenomenological theory of pleasure can offer a better explanation of (1)-(3) than any attitudinal or disunified theory. Attitudinal theories cannot plausibly account for (3), and disunified theories fail with respect to both (2) and (3).
This has major implications for value theory. It is common for philosophers to claim that pleasure is intrinsically valuable. But if this is true, and the phenomenological approach to pleasure is right, then it is possible for something (namely pleasure) to be valuable without being the object of a valuing attitude. In other words, the claim that pleasure is intrinsically good, together with a phenomenological theory of pleasure, entail that subjectivism about value is false.
2. The Indifference Objection to Theories of Welfare
Objective theories in the philosophy of welfare say that some things can be good for you even when you do not want, like, or value them. Such theories face the objection that nothing can be good for you if you do not bear some kind of favorable attitude toward it. Call this the “indifference objection”. This aim of this paper to dispel this objection.
We must distinguish the indifference objection from the much-discussed “resonance constraint” on theories of welfare. The resonance constraint says, roughly, that whatever is intrinsically good for S must be something that S could want, like, or value under the right circumstances. The indifference objection is stricter: it says that for X to be intrinsically good for S at t, S must have some favorable attitude toward X at t.
To avoid the indifference objection, a theory must say that something can be good for you only if it is the object of the right sort of occurrent favorable attitude. Hence the indifference objection applies not only to objective theories of welfare, but also to some subjective theories. For example, it applies to any desire-satisfaction theory that identifies a subject’s welfare with the satisfaction of the subject’s idealized desires rather than their actual ones. It also applies to desire-satisfaction theories that say that what is good for a subject is the combination of an actual intrinsic desire with the state of affairs that satisfies it.
But, I argue, the “actualist” theories of welfare that avoid the indifference objection are independently implausible. Such theories face a dilemma. If they allow certain things to be the objects of value-activating attitudes, then they are at best normatively implausible and at worst logically incoherent. But the more they restrict the range of acceptable objects of value-activating attitudes, the more they appear to be objective theories of welfare in disguise.
3. Phenomenal Conservatism and Evaluative Seemings
Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), as defined by Michael Huemer, says the following: if it seems to S that p, then in the absence of defeaters, S is thereby justified to some degree in believing that p.
For this paper, I am interested in what PC can offer to value theory. If PC is true, then what evaluative propositions can we legitimately claim to be prima facie justified in believing?
A seeming, as understood here, is as a non-belief, non-inferential mental state. According to PC, seemings are sources of basic justification: an undefeated seeming that p confers justification on a belief that p in a way that does not depend on any other belief.
The plausibility of PC depends on the stipulation that seemings are non-belief, non-inferential mental states. But this raises a question: when we feel inclined to believe that p, how do we know that this inclination is (or is the result of) a genuine seeming? How do we know that this inclination is not just the result of our already believing that p, or of an inference from pre-existing beliefs? If we do not know this, then even if seemings justify some of our beliefs, we will not be justified in claiming that they do. This would make PC epistemically useless, at least when it comes to philosophical argumentation.
I propose that we cannot introspectively distinguish genuine seemings from other conscious inclinations to believe propositions. Nor can we plausibly claim that certain inclinations to believe simply seem like seemings. Call this the “introspection problem” for PC. To solve the introspection problem for a given proposition that we feel consciously inclined to believe, we need to be justified on non-introspective grounds in believing that this inclination either is a seeming or is ultimately traceable to a seeming.
The introspection problem is especially pressing for evaluative propositions, because in many cases, we can plausibly account for our inclinations to believe evaluative propositions by proposing that these inclinations merely reflect preexisting beliefs or inferences therefrom. The same cannot be said of, for example, many perceptual propositions. (If I am inclined to believe on the basis of vision that my hand is currently in front of my face at time t, it is not plausible that this is something I just happened to already believe before t, or an inference from things I already believed before t.)
I argue that the introspection problem can be solved for some basic evaluative propositions, such as the proposition that it is possible for a person’s life to get worse for them. There is no plausible explanation of our inclination to believe this proposition according to which it is not traceable to a seeming. However, the introspection problem still afflicts many other evaluative propositions. Even something as uncontroversial as the proposition that suffering is bad may not be immune.
I conclude that PC offers value theorists a small supply of basically justified propositions. However, this may be all we need to undergird plausible and sophisticated theories of prudential and moral value.
4. Scalar Utilitarianism and Political Activism
Classical act utilitarianism (CAU) fits awkwardly with some of our considered judgments about political activism. Though people disagree about what kinds of political activism are laudable, virtually all can agree that some such actions are morally commendable. In cases where the costs of collective political inaction are high, some may even regard participation in activism as morally obligatory. But in many real cases, including those most likely to be seen as morally commendable or obligatory, CAU delivers the verdict that individual acts of participation in political activism are morally wrong.
Scalar utilitarianism (SU), which dispenses with judgments of moral right and wrong in favor of evaluating acts against one another on a continuous scale of good and bad (according to how much net utility they produce), does not have this troubling implication. Thus, though often regarded as a less intuitive variant of utilitarianism, SU has a distinct advantage over CAU when it comes to vindicating common sense judgments about political activism.
Political activism typically requires mass collective effort, in which individual contributions to the success of the movement are negligible. Hence in many cases, participation in political activism will require that an agent perform acts that are not the most utility-conducive available, and which are therefore by CAU’s lights morally wrong. This is true on both the objective (actual utility) and subjective (rationally expected utility) interpretations of CAU.
This presents a dilemma for classical act utilitarians. They must either affirm that many individual contributions to political movements, including those movements that have been massively utility-producing in aggregate, are not morally commendable; or they must affirm that there can be acts which are both morally commendable and wrong.
SU avoids this dilemma, and allows utilitarians to assess political activism in a clear and coherent manner. Political activism is morally risky. In cases of resistance to repressive regimes, one can even be gambling with one’s life (and those of others). Well-intentioned political activists will perform some acts that are utilitarianly sub-optimal, including some that produce more bad than good. But they are not morally wrong in doing so. Moreover, we can coherently affirm that many such acts are morally commendable, insofar as they reflect generally utility-promoting traits of the agent.