|
My dissertation defends a view of well-being I call "basic prudential hedonism". You can read it here.
I'm currently working on a few different papers about pleasure and pain, well-being, the epistemology of value, and utilitarianism. Brief descriptions of these are given below. |
|
Against All Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure and Pain
Consider these two scenarios:
In (1), do you feel any pleasure? In (2), do you feel any pain?
On any plausible phenomenological theory of pleasure and pain, the answer to both questions is "yes".
But on attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain - which I take to encompass all theories on which pleasures and/or pains necessarily involve attitudes - the answer is "maybe, maybe not".
I argue that the "maybe, maybe not" answer is implausible on both descriptive and normative grounds, and that we should therefore reject all attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain and embrace a phenomenological view instead.
A Moral Objection to the "Resonance Constraint" on Theories of Welfare
The "resonance constraint" on theories of welfare says, roughly, that whatever is intrinsically good for S must be something that S could want, like, or value under the right circumstances. I argue that we should reject the resonance constraint on moral grounds.
To this end, I propose a possible scenario in which, if any version of the resonance constraint were correct, there would be nothing morally objectionable about treating someone in a way that is intuitively very harmful to them, nor anything morally commendable about treating them in a way that is intutively very beneficial.
Phenomenal Conservatism and Evaluative Seemings
Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), as defined by Michael Huemer, says the following: if it seems to S that p, then in the absence of defeaters, S is thereby justified to some degree in believing that p.
I am interested in what PC can offer to value theory. If PC is true, then what evaluative propositions can we legitimately claim to be prima facie justified in believing?
A seeming, as understood here, is as a non-belief, non-inferential mental state. According to PC, seemings are sources of basic justification: an undefeated seeming that p confers justification on a belief that p in a way that does not depend on any other belief.
The plausibility of PC depends on the stipulation that seemings are non-belief, non-inferential mental states. But this raises a question: when we feel inclined to believe that p, how do we know that this inclination is (or is the result of) a genuine seeming? How do we know that this inclination is not just the result of our already believing that p, or of an inference from pre-existing beliefs? If we do not know this, then even if seemings justify some of our beliefs, we will not be justified in claiming that they do. This would make PC epistemically useless, at least when it comes to philosophical argumentation.
I propose that we cannot introspectively distinguish genuine seemings from other conscious inclinations to believe propositions. Nor can we plausibly claim that certain inclinations to believe simply seem like seemings. Call this the “introspection problem” for PC. To solve the introspection problem for a given proposition that we feel consciously inclined to believe, we need to be justified on non-introspective grounds in believing that this inclination either is a seeming or is ultimately traceable to a seeming.
I argue that the introspection problem can be solved for some basic evaluative propositions, such as the proposition that it is possible for a person’s life to get worse for them. However, the introspection problem still afflicts many other evaluative propositions. Even something as uncontroversial as the proposition that suffering is bad may not be immune.
I conclude that PC offers value theorists a small supply of basically justified propositions, which may be all we need to undergird plausible and sophisticated theories of prudential and moral value.
Scalar Utilitarianism and Political Activism
Classical act utilitarianism (CAU) fits awkwardly with some of our considered judgments about political activism. Though people disagree about what kinds of political activism are laudable, virtually all can agree that some such actions are morally commendable. In cases where the costs of collective political inaction are high, some may even regard participation in activism as morally obligatory. But in many real cases, including those most likely to be seen as morally commendable or obligatory, CAU delivers the verdict that individual acts of participation in political activism are morally wrong.
Scalar utilitarianism (SU), which dispenses with judgments of moral right and wrong in favor of evaluating acts against one another on a continuous scale of good and bad (according to how much net utility they produce), does not have this troubling implication. Thus, though often regarded as a less intuitive variant of utilitarianism, SU has a distinct advantage over CAU when it comes to vindicating common sense judgments about political activism.
Political activism typically requires mass collective effort, in which individual contributions to the success of the movement are negligible. Hence in many cases, participation in political activism will require that an agent perform acts that are not the most utility-conducive available, and which are therefore by CAU’s lights morally wrong. This is true on both the objective (actual utility) and subjective (rationally expected utility) interpretations of CAU.
This presents a dilemma for classical act utilitarians. They must either affirm that many individual contributions to political movements, including those movements that have been massively utility-producing in aggregate, are not morally commendable; or they must affirm that there can be acts which are both morally commendable and wrong.
SU avoids this dilemma, and allows utilitarians to assess political activism in a clear and coherent manner. Political activism is morally risky. In cases of resistance to repressive regimes, one can even be gambling with one’s life (and those of others). Well-intentioned political activists will perform some acts that are utilitarianly sub-optimal, including some that produce more bad than good. But they are not morally wrong in doing so. Moreover, we can coherently affirm that many such acts are morally commendable, insofar as they reflect generally utility-promoting traits of the agent.
Consider these two scenarios:
- You get a nice massage, feeling everything that you would expect to feel during such an experience.
- You shatter your femur, feeling everything that you would expect to feel during such an experience.
In (1), do you feel any pleasure? In (2), do you feel any pain?
On any plausible phenomenological theory of pleasure and pain, the answer to both questions is "yes".
But on attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain - which I take to encompass all theories on which pleasures and/or pains necessarily involve attitudes - the answer is "maybe, maybe not".
I argue that the "maybe, maybe not" answer is implausible on both descriptive and normative grounds, and that we should therefore reject all attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain and embrace a phenomenological view instead.
A Moral Objection to the "Resonance Constraint" on Theories of Welfare
The "resonance constraint" on theories of welfare says, roughly, that whatever is intrinsically good for S must be something that S could want, like, or value under the right circumstances. I argue that we should reject the resonance constraint on moral grounds.
To this end, I propose a possible scenario in which, if any version of the resonance constraint were correct, there would be nothing morally objectionable about treating someone in a way that is intuitively very harmful to them, nor anything morally commendable about treating them in a way that is intutively very beneficial.
Phenomenal Conservatism and Evaluative Seemings
Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), as defined by Michael Huemer, says the following: if it seems to S that p, then in the absence of defeaters, S is thereby justified to some degree in believing that p.
I am interested in what PC can offer to value theory. If PC is true, then what evaluative propositions can we legitimately claim to be prima facie justified in believing?
A seeming, as understood here, is as a non-belief, non-inferential mental state. According to PC, seemings are sources of basic justification: an undefeated seeming that p confers justification on a belief that p in a way that does not depend on any other belief.
The plausibility of PC depends on the stipulation that seemings are non-belief, non-inferential mental states. But this raises a question: when we feel inclined to believe that p, how do we know that this inclination is (or is the result of) a genuine seeming? How do we know that this inclination is not just the result of our already believing that p, or of an inference from pre-existing beliefs? If we do not know this, then even if seemings justify some of our beliefs, we will not be justified in claiming that they do. This would make PC epistemically useless, at least when it comes to philosophical argumentation.
I propose that we cannot introspectively distinguish genuine seemings from other conscious inclinations to believe propositions. Nor can we plausibly claim that certain inclinations to believe simply seem like seemings. Call this the “introspection problem” for PC. To solve the introspection problem for a given proposition that we feel consciously inclined to believe, we need to be justified on non-introspective grounds in believing that this inclination either is a seeming or is ultimately traceable to a seeming.
I argue that the introspection problem can be solved for some basic evaluative propositions, such as the proposition that it is possible for a person’s life to get worse for them. However, the introspection problem still afflicts many other evaluative propositions. Even something as uncontroversial as the proposition that suffering is bad may not be immune.
I conclude that PC offers value theorists a small supply of basically justified propositions, which may be all we need to undergird plausible and sophisticated theories of prudential and moral value.
Scalar Utilitarianism and Political Activism
Classical act utilitarianism (CAU) fits awkwardly with some of our considered judgments about political activism. Though people disagree about what kinds of political activism are laudable, virtually all can agree that some such actions are morally commendable. In cases where the costs of collective political inaction are high, some may even regard participation in activism as morally obligatory. But in many real cases, including those most likely to be seen as morally commendable or obligatory, CAU delivers the verdict that individual acts of participation in political activism are morally wrong.
Scalar utilitarianism (SU), which dispenses with judgments of moral right and wrong in favor of evaluating acts against one another on a continuous scale of good and bad (according to how much net utility they produce), does not have this troubling implication. Thus, though often regarded as a less intuitive variant of utilitarianism, SU has a distinct advantage over CAU when it comes to vindicating common sense judgments about political activism.
Political activism typically requires mass collective effort, in which individual contributions to the success of the movement are negligible. Hence in many cases, participation in political activism will require that an agent perform acts that are not the most utility-conducive available, and which are therefore by CAU’s lights morally wrong. This is true on both the objective (actual utility) and subjective (rationally expected utility) interpretations of CAU.
This presents a dilemma for classical act utilitarians. They must either affirm that many individual contributions to political movements, including those movements that have been massively utility-producing in aggregate, are not morally commendable; or they must affirm that there can be acts which are both morally commendable and wrong.
SU avoids this dilemma, and allows utilitarians to assess political activism in a clear and coherent manner. Political activism is morally risky. In cases of resistance to repressive regimes, one can even be gambling with one’s life (and those of others). Well-intentioned political activists will perform some acts that are utilitarianly sub-optimal, including some that produce more bad than good. But they are not morally wrong in doing so. Moreover, we can coherently affirm that many such acts are morally commendable, insofar as they reflect generally utility-promoting traits of the agent.